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Valid Existing Rights Under the
Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977:
Determination by Adjudication is




There have not been many appeals to the appeal boards in
the Department of the Interior's Office of Hearings and Appeals
(OHA) from determinations by the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) whether a person does
or does not hold valid existing rights to conduct surface mining
operations, subject to the requirements of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA or the Act),' in
areas where it would otherwise be precluded by Section 522(e)
of the Act. 2 With the exception of the "takings" test, however,
the central concepts of the rules by which the Department has
attempted to define valid existing rights (VER) e.g., the "good
faith-all permits" test, and the "needed for and immediately
adjacent to an ongoing surface mining operation" test, have
been applied in at least one decision issued by either the Interior
Board of Surface Mining Appeals or the Interior Board of Land
Appeals. In this article we review these decisions and the pro-
cedural rules that govern administrative review of OSMRE's
* Administrative Judge, Interior Board of Land Appeals. A.B., 1965, The Uni-
versity of Michigan; J.D., 1970, The University of Michigan Law School. Member of
the Bar, State of Vermont, District of Columbia.
** Attorney-Advisor, Interior Board of Land Appeals. B.A., 1974, Berea College;
M.A., 1976, Louisiana State University; J.D., 1980, The University of Kentucky; LL.M.,
1985, Columbia University. Member of the Bar, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
2 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
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VER determinations. We conclude, however, that VER should
be determined by adjudication, applying state law to the legal
documents under which VER are claimed, and that the addi-
tional tests that have been proposed in the Department's efforts
to define VER by rule are unnecessary to and, indeed, contra-
dictory to the proper case-by-case approach to determining
whether a person holds valid existing rights in a particular situ-
ation.
II. INTERIOR BOARD OF SURFACE MINING APPEALS AND
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS EXPERIENCE WITH VALID
EXISTING RIGHTS
A. VER to Conduct Surface Mining Operations on Non-
Federal and Non-Indian Lands
1. The Ronald W. Johnson Cases
a. Factual Background
On December 16, 1972, Ronald W. Johnson bought four
acres and a residence from William Lamont, who reserved the
coal and other mineral rights in the four acres. On July 14,
1977, Lamont deeded to Peabody Coal Company 406 acres
adjoining Johnson's property as well as Lamont's reserved min-
eral rights in Johnson's property. At that time, part of the
property could not be mined because of a city ordinance pro-
hibiting mining within certain areas. On February 27, 1978, the
city council of Sparta, Illinois finalized action which permitted
mining within 1.5 miles of the city limits, thus allowing Peabody
to mine the entire property purchased from Lamont.3 On Jan-
uary 2, 1980, Peabody applied for a "new permit," which was
issued on May 14, 1980. This permit, Illinois permit No. 920-
82, prohibited mining within 300 feet of Johnson's house. On
May 9, 1980, Johnson moved a mobile home onto the northwest
corner of his lot. On May 12, 1980, he asked OSMRE to monitor
his property for several possible violations of SMCRA and initial
program regulations by Peabody, including mining within 300
I Ronald W. Johnson, 3 IBSMA 118, 120, 88 I.D. 495, 496 (1981).
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feet of occupied dwellings. In late May, he moved a second
mobile home onto the southwest corner of his lot' On June 4,
1980, OSMRE informed Johnson that the state regulatory au-
thority would need to make a determination of whether Peabody
had VER to mine the areas around the mobile homes. OSMRE
inspected the property on June 27, 1980, and issued an inspection
report stating that Peabody "can (probably) demonstrate to the
regulatory authority that the coal is needed for and immediately
adjacent to an ongoing surface coal mining operation for which
all permits were obtained prior to the enactment of SMCRA."
On July 18, 1980, the OSMRE Regional Director (Region III)
affirmed the decision not to take enforcement action against
Peabody, and on August 27, 1980, Illinois determined that Pea-
body had VER under OSMRE regulations.'
b. Ronald W. Johnson I
Johnson appealed the Regional Director's decision to the
Interior Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals
(Board). In Ronald W. Johnson 1,6 the Board recognized that
during the initial regulatory program, Section 522(e) of SMCRA,
7
and 30 C.F.R. Section 710.4 "place the primary responsibility
for determining whether a permittee has valid existing rights
with the state regulatory authority for those areas over which
the state has control."'8 However, the State's responsibility "is
not exercised totally independently of Federal oversight, because
during the initial program, the Federal Government is an inde-
pendent regulatory body." 9 The Board stated that "[A]Ithough
OSM may defer to the state for an initial determination on valid
existing rights, when that determination is properly questioned,
OSM has an independent responsibility to review it to ensure
that it was made in compliance with the initial program regula-
tions." 10 Since OSMRE's decision was issued before Illinois made
its VER determination, the Board remanded the case to OSMRE
for an evaluation of whether the State had properly applied the
regulations.
4 3 IBSMA at 120-21, 88 I.D. at 496-97.
1 3 IBSMA at 121, 88 I.D. at 497.
6 3 IBSMA 118, 88 I.D. 495 (1981).
7 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
1 3 IBSMA at 122, 88 I.D. at 497.
9Id.
10 3 IBSMA at 122-23. 88 I.D. at 498.
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c. Ronald W. Johnson II
In Ronald W. Johnson II," the Board reviewed the conse-
quent decision of the Regional Director of OSMRE that Peabody
had VER to conduct surface coal mining and reclamation op-
erations within 300 feet of his dwellings. In his finding No. (1)
the Regional Director set forth 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(a), the
original definition of VER promulgated by OSMRE in 1979,
referred to as the "all permits" test:
valid existing rights means:
(a) Except for haul roads,
(1) Those property rights in existence on August 3, 1977, that
were created by a legally binding conveyance, lease, deed,
contract or other document which authorizes the applicant to
produce coal by a surface coal mining operation; and
(2) The person proposing to conduct surface coal mining op-
erations on such lands either
(i) Had been validly issued, on or before August 3, 1977, all
State and Federal permits necessary to conduct such operations
on those lands, or
(ii) Can demonstrate to the regulatory authority that the coal
is both needed for, and immediately adjacent to, an ongoing
surface coal mining operation for which all permits were ob-
tained prior to August 3, 1977.12
This regulation, as originally adopted, included the following
subsection (c), which was cursorily applied in the Board's John-
son II decision:
Interpretation of the terms of the document relied upon to
establish valid existing rights shall be based upon the usage
and custom at the time and place where it came into existence
and upon a showing by the applicant that the parties to the
document actually contemplated a right to conduct the same
underground or surface mining activities for which the appli-
cant claims a valid existing right.' 3
In his decision on remand, the Regional Director purported
to apply subsection (c) in interpreting the instruments upon
which Peabody relied in claiming the requisite "property rights"
under 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(a)(1):





Peabody had the requisite property rights on August 3,
1977, as required by 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(1), which would
authorize the company to produce coal by a surface coal
mining operation, pursuant to a memorandum of agreement
dated December 29, 1975, and a deed executed on July 14,
1977. By means of these instruments, Peabody acquired the
necessary surface property and mineral rights. The property
rights contemplated by 30 C.F.R. 761.5 were such as were held
by Peabody in the instant case, i.e., a legally binding convey-
ance, the parties to which, at the time the deed was executed,
contemplated Peabody's right to conduct surface coal mining
activities. 14
Having concluded that Peabody possessed the necessary
"property rights," the Regional Director applied the "needed
for and immediately adjacent to" test contained in 30 C.F.R.
Section 761.5(a)(1)(ii): 5
(3) An investigation by OSM's Reclamation Specialists estab-
lishes that Peabody River King #6 surface operation was an
operation which was established on Illinois permit 560-79 is-
sued in 1976. Consequently, an ongoing surface coal mining
operation had been installed by Peabody Coal Company prior
to August 3, 1977, as required by 30 C.F.R. 761.5(a)(2)(ii);
(4) Aerial photographs dated 1978, 1979, and 1980, reviewed
by the OSM Reclamation Specialist, in addition to field obser-
vations, establish the direction of the Peabody River King #6
operation. The coal contained in Illinois permit 920-82 is im-
mediately adjacent to the permit established in Illinois pit 560-
79 and is the logical extension of the pit established in Illinois
permit 560-79 as is necessary to meet the requirements of 30
C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(2)(ii);
(5) The Reclamation Specialist, based upon his field observa-
tions, determined that the coal was needed to continue the
existing operation because of the configuration of the existing
" The Board inserted a reference to 44 Fed.Reg. 14,992 (Mar. 13, 1979). Ronald
W. Johnson, 5 IBSMA 19, 23, 90 I.D. 54 (1983).
,1 Presumably the Regional Director's finding (No. 3) that Peabody held the
necessary permits to conduct the surface mining operation explains why his findings do
not contain an application of the "all permits" provisions of the regulation, i.e., 30
C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(2)(i). He simply stated that the Peabody River King #6 surface
operation was "established on Illinois permit 560-79 issued in 1976." He concludes that
the proposed operations on Illinois permit No. 920-82, which are the subject of the
Ronald W. Johnson cases, meet the "needed for and immediately adjacent to" test of
30 CFR 761.5(a)(2)(ii). Illinois permit No. 920-82 was issued on May 14, 1980.
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operation. In addition, Peabody Coal Company, in its request
to the Department of Mines and Minerals, indicates that loss
of coal would be approximately 31,000 tons.
(6) A review of the decision made by the Illinois Department
of Mines and Minerals indicates that its conclusion that Pea-
body Coal Company has valid existing rights to mine within
300 feet of the Johnson mobile homes is consistent with Find-
ings (1)-(5), in that Illinois found that:
(a) Peabody had purchased the property in question prior to
August 3, 1977; and
(b) Peabody had an operation in existence on August 3, 1977
for which all permits had been issued and that the area in
question is adjacent to the pre-existing permit and that the
coal from the area is needed for its operation.1
6
As to Johnson's contention that Peabody did not have VER
to conduct surface coal mining operations on his property be-
cause it was not zoned to permit surface mining until February
27, 1978, the Regional Director stated:
30 C.F.R. § 761.5 does not require that at the time a company
acquires requisite property rights that it also have complete
assurance, by virtue of zoning and/or permit, that it will be
allowed to immediately mine the area. Neither a permit to
mine nor appropriate zoning constitutes a "property right"
within the meaning of 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(1). All that is
required is property ownership and the contemplation of sur-
face mining by the parties to the conveyance. In the instant
case the conveyance clearly and properly transferred marketa-
ble title to Peabody, thus satisfying the ownership requirement.
That the parties to the conveyance contemplated surface min-
ing is evident from the fact that seller, William Lamont, trans-
ferred both surface and mineral rights to purchaser, Peabody
Coal Company, a coal company conducting surface mining
activities adjacent to the property in question. 17
Johnson argued on appeal to the Board that:
the deed executed by Peabody and William V. Lamont did not
serve to convey to Peabody the property rights necessary to
satisfy the requirements of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(a)(1) be-
cause (1) the deed did not specifically authorize Peabody to
6 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(1)(ii).
,7 5 IBSMA at 25, 90 I.D. at 57, (quoting Decision of the Regional Director at 2-
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produce coal by surface mining methods and (2) the zoning
ordinance of the city of Sparta precluded surface coal mining
at the time of the conveyance.'
8
The Board rejected Johnson's arguments.
In reviewing the Regional Director's decision, the Board
considered the role of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(c), regarding
application of local usage and custom, in applying the first
element of the Department's definition of VER set forth at 30
C.F.R. Section 761.5(a)(1), i.e., "[t]hose property rights in ex-
istence on August 3, 1977, that were created by a legally binding
conveyance, lease, deed, contract or other document which au-
thorizes the applicant to produce coal by a surface coal mining
operation." 9 The Board noted that in connection with litigation
before the District Court for the District of Columbia, the
Department agreed that, as an alternative to applying subsection
(c) of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5, "existing State law may be
applied to interpret whether the document relied upon establishes
valid existing rights. "20
The Board first rejected Johnson's argument that the deed
between Lamont and Peabody did not convey the necessary
property rights for VER under 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(a)(1)
because the deed did not specify that Peabody could surface
mine the coal. The Board stated:
Since the grantor [Lamont] did not reserve to himself any
interest in the surface or mineral estates conveyed, it is im-
material that he did not specify that Peabody could surface
mine the mineral estate. For the purposes of section 522(e) of
the Act and 30 CFR Part 761, we assume the requisite au-
thorization to surface mine coal, in the absence of language
to the contrary in the conveyance, from the fact of Peabody's
purchase of both the mineral and surface estates.
2'
Secondly, the Board rejected Johnson's contention that "the
zoning ordinance of the city of Sparta was a right of the public,
as referred to in the deed, that precluded the necessary author-
ization to produce coal by surface mining under 30 C.F.R.
' 5 IBSMA at 25-26, 90 I.D. at 57.
30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(1).
20 44 Fed.Reg. 67,942 (1979); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig.
1, 14 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1083 (D. D.C. 1980).
11 5 IBSMA at 27-28, 90 I.D. at 58.
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[Section] 761.5(a)(1). ' ' 22 The Board deferred to State law "hold-
ing, in effect, that Sparta's zoning law could not operate to
preclude surface coal mining either at the time the deed between
Lamont and Peabody was executed, or on August 3, 1977, the
effective date of the Act."
2
d. "Usage and Custom" and "Intention of the Parties"
The Board stated that "Johnson's contention, that the lack
of express authorization to surface mine coal precludes valid
existing rights, may be the result of a misunderstanding of the
regulatory background of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5." The Board
recognized that "[tihe manifest intention of the parties to the
document by which one claims valid existing rights was deemed
relevant by the Department because of congressional references
to United States v. Polino5 in the legislative history of the term
'valid existing rights."' 26
The Board's analysis of the Polino case and its relevance to
the background of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5, as well as the
Board's application of subsection (c) of that regulation, appears
flawed for a number of reasons. In Polino, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia addressed the
specific question "whether or not a reservation of coal and
mining rights contained in a certain deed carried with it the legal
right to employ mining methods known as 'strip mining' in the
mining and removing of certain coal." ' 27 The lands in question
were located in the Monongahela National Forest. The District
Court stated that it was bound under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins to answer this question with reference to the laws
of West Virginia as contained in the decisions of the Supreme
'2 5 IBSMA at 29, 90 I.D. at 59.
Id. (footnote omitted) See American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of
Knox, 324 N.E.2d 398, 60 Ill.2d 133 (1974) (reclamation of strip mined land is governed
exclusively by the Illinois Surface Mined Land Conservation and Reclamation Act of
1971, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 961/2, para. 4501 (1977), and a county has no authority to
regulate reclamation procedures); Union National Bank and Trust Co. v. Board of
Supervisors, 382 N.E.2d 1382, 1385-86, 65 I11. App.3d 1004 (1978) (a county "has no
power to seek to prohibit the operation of stripmining subject to the Reclamation Act
anywhere in the county, pursuant to a zoning ordinance.").
5 IBSMA at 28, 90 I.D. at 58.
25 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. W.Va. 1955).
5 IBSMA at 28, 90 I.D. at 58.
217 131 F. Supp. at 772.
- 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The decisions of the West
Virginia Court considered by the Polino court define two related
criteria for determining whether a deed authorizes the removal
of coal by surface mining techniques: (1) the usage and custom
in the locality where the coal is located and (2) whether the
parties actually contemplated that the coal would be removed
by surface mining methods.
In one such case, Oresta v. Romano Bros. ,29 the Court
stated:
It is evident from the language of the reservation of the mining
rights, that, at the date of the deed of severance of the coal
on February 24, 1885, the parties to the deed intended that
the coal should be mined and removed by the usual method
then known and accepted as common practice in Mercer County,
where the lands in question are located, and that such method,
as it then existed, did not include the practice of mining and
removing coal by strip mining.
The court's reasoning in West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Strong3 ° is to the same effect:
In order for a usage or custom to affect the meaning of a
contract in writing because within the contemplation of the
parties thereto, it must be shown that the usage or custom was
one generally followed at the time and place of the contract's
execution.
We are of the opinion, arrived at by reading the instrument
as a whole, that it was the manifest intention of the parties to
preserve intact the surface of the entire tract, subject to the
use of the owner of the coal 'at convenient point or points' in
order 'to mine, dig, excavate and remove all of said coal' by
the usual method at that time known and accepted as common
practice in Brooke County. We do not believe that this in-
cluded the practice known as strip mining. 11
In Polino, the court found that "at the time of the reser-
vation of the coal and other minerals in the deed to the United
- 73 S.E.2d 622, 627 (W.Va. 1952).
42 S.E.2d 46 (W.Va. 1947).
I, d. at 47, 48. The court also referred to Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh
Brick & Tile Co., 97 S.E. 684, 686 (W.Va. 1919) ("In this case we have no evidence as
to the situation of the parties at the time of the grant, or their conduct under it, which
would aid us in the interpretation of it.").
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States of America, there were no coal strip mining operations
in Randolph County, West Virginia, where these lands are lo-
cated." '3 2 Moreover, the court stated that "it is obvious that
both parties to that deed knew the purposes for which the United
States was acquiring the land and the uses to which it was
intended to be put," and that "[ilt is beyond all reason to
conclude that the parties to the deed . .., at the time of the
execution of such deed, had in contemplation the possible com-
plete destruction and removal of the entire surface of said lands,
together with everything growing thereon.""
In the preamble to the original permanent program regula-
tions, OSMRE defined the Polino court's holding in terms of
"whether the deed conveying the coal ... specifically granted
the right of extraction by surface mining." 34 According to
OSMRE's characterization of the ruling in Polino, "unless the
deed or lease 'expressly grants stripping rights', the coal could
only be mined by deep mining so as not to disturb the surface." 35
In OSMRE's view, Polino "relates to the nature of the right
being conveyed between private parties and the method of inter-
preting the document which conveys that right." '3 6 The final
definition of VER "incorporates these concepts." Subsection (c)
of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5, in fact, mirrors Polino and the West
Virginia cases discussed in Polino.
The Board's application of 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(c) and
Polino in Ronald W. Johnson II amounts to one sentence:
"Neither the Polino decision nor the regulatory language in 30
C.F.R. [Section) 761.5 based on that decision dictates that valid
existing rights cannot be established absent express language
authorizing surface mining in the document under which the
requisite property rights are claimed." ' 37 The Board was correct
in stating that the document need not expressly authorize surface
mining in order for a party to have VER to conduct surface
mining operations. However, under subsection (c) of 30 CFR
761.5, the Board should have proceeded to interpret the instru-
ments, including the deed from Lamont to Johnson that reserved
32 131 F. Supp. at 775.
Id. at 776.
44 Fed.Reg. at 14,992 (1979).
35 Id.
3. Id.
37 5 IBSMA at 28-29, 90 I.D. at 59.
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the coal under Johnson's land, in light of "the usage and custom
at the time and place where [they] came into existence," and to
consider whether Peabody had shown "that the parties to the
document actually contemplated a right to conduct the ...
surface mining activities for which [Peabody] claims a valid
existing right." 3" A clear demonstration of how those two criteria
should have been applied appears in the Polino opinion. Of
course, a provision expressly precluding removal of the coal by
surface mining methods would amount to a clear manifestation
of the parties' intention that surface mining methods not be
used. If there is no express prohibition, the deed should be
interpreted with reference first to usage and custom in the lo-
cality, and second, to the actual intentions of the parties. While
the document need not expressly reserve unto Peabody the right
to extract the coal by surface mining methods, Peabody should
have been required to show that the parties to the document
"actually contemplated" the use of such methods.3 9
2. Valley Camp Coal Co.
a. Procedural Background
In Valley Camp Coal Co. v. OSMRE,4° OSMRE issued a
Notice of Violation (NOV) to Valley Camp for conducting sur-
face coal mining operations in violation of Section 522(e)(4) of
SMCRA by stockpiling coal within 100 feet of the outside line
of a public road without a mining permit, and subsequently
issued a Cessation Order (CO) citing Valley Camp for failure to
abate the NOV. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge
McGuire denied Valley Camp's application for review of the
NOV, and its applications for review of and temporary relief
from the CO, concluding that its stockpiling operations consti-
tuted surface coal mining operations in violation of Section
522(e)(4) of SMCRA, and that appellant had engaged in such
operations without possessing VER.
Valley Camp appealed Judge McGuire's decision to the Board,
which ruled by order that Valley Camp, "by stockpiling coal,
38 Id.
39 Id.
- 112 IBLA 19, 96 I.D. 455 (1989).
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was engaged in surface coal mining operations."'" However,
noting that Judge Flannery had remanded to the Department
the regulation defining VER in terms of whether there was a
"taking," the Board concluded "that there is no regulation to
apply in this case in determining whether appellant has a
[VER] ."42 Accordingly, the Board suspended "consideration of
this case pending promulgation of a final rule defining that
statutory term. '43
On September 29, 1988, OSMRE filed a motion to lift the
stay in Valley Camp Coal Co., pointing to its November 20,
1986, suspension notice which explained that for ... lands in
states which have obtained permanent program approval, "State
programs will remain in effect until the Director of OSMRE has
examined the provisions of each State program to determine
whether changes are necessary and has notified the State regu-
latory authority ... that a State program amendment is re-
quired."44 OSMRE advised the Board that West Virginia obtained
permanent program approval in January 1981, and that with
regard to non-Federal lands in West Virginia, West Virginia's
definition of VER should govern in making VER determinations.
OSMRE further advised the Board that West Virginia's perma-
nent program contains the following VER definition, which was
not affected by Judge Flannery's remand of 30 C.F.R. Section
761.5 for lack of notice and comment:
Valid Existing Rights exists, except for haulroads, in each case
in which a person demonstrates that the limitation provided
for in Section 22(d) of the Act would result in the unconsti-
tutional taking of that person's rights .... A person possesses
valid existing rights if he can demonstrate that the coal is
immediately adjacent to an ongoing mining operation which
existed on August 3, 1977 and is needed to make the operation
as a whole economically viable. Valid existing rights shall also
be found for an area where a person can demonstrate that an
SMA [Surface Mining Act] number had been issued prior to
the time when the structure, road, cemetery or other activity
listed in Section 22(d) of the Act came into existence.
45
41 112 IBLA at 23, 96 I.D. at 458, quoting Order dated Feb. 25, 1986, at 2.
42 Id.
43 Id.
- 51 Fed.Reg. 41,952 (1986).
4 W.Va. Code of State Regulations § 38-2-2.119 (1987).
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In response to OSMRE's motion that it lift the stay and
apply West Virginia's regulation in determining whether Valley
Camp had VER to stockpile the coal in question, the Board
observed that the NOV and the CO involved were issued in 1980,
while West Virginia's permanent program was not approved until
January 1981, and that "[nleither OSMRE nor Valley Camp
explains why or how West Virginia's permanent program regu-
lation would apply rather than the Federal regulation in effect
when the NOV and related CO were issued." 46 The Board di-
rected OSMRE to file a brief supporting its motion, responding
to a number of questions relating to whether a standard exists
for determining whether Valley Camp had VER to stockpile the
coal.
Rather than submit a brief as directed, OSMRE filed a
motion requesting the Board to vacate the NOV and the CO
issued to Valley Camp in 1980. OSMRE pointed out that Section
522(e)(4) of SMCRA prohibits surface coal mining operations
within 100 feet of the outside line of a public right-of-way, with
two exceptions: (1) where the operator has VER; and (2) where
the subject operation was in existence on the date of enactment
of SMCRA. OSMRE argued that because Valley Camp's stock-
piling operation existed on the date of enactment of SMCRA,
Valley Camp had no obligation to "secure a surface mining
permit under either the West Virginia State Law or under
SMCRA. Nor were its surface mining operations subject to the
prohibitions of Section 522(e).
' ' 47
By order dated May 11, 1989, the Board denied OSMRE's
motion to vacate the NOV and the CO, and lifted the suspension
imposed in 1986. In its order, the Board declared that it would
apply the definition of VER in effect at the time the NOV was
issued, i.e., "the 1979 test, including the 'needed for and adja-
cent' test, as modified by the August 4, 1980, suspension notice
which implemented the District Court's February 1980 opinion
in In Re: Permanent (I).' ' 48
b. The "In Existence" Exception under Section 522(e)
As previously noted, in its motion to vacate the NOV and
CO, OSMRE argued that the emphasis upon VER in this case
" 112 IBLA at 26, 96 I.D. at 459.
41 112 IBLA at 27, 96 I.D. at 460, quoting Motion to Vacate at 2-3.
, 112 IBLA at 27-28, 96 I.D. at 460, quoting Order dated May 11, 1989, at 5-6,
and citing In re: Permanent (I), 14 Envtl. Rep. Cas. 1083 (D. D.C. 1980).
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was misplaced, since Valley Camp's stockpiling activity was "in
existence" on August 3, 1977, when SMCRA was enacted.4 9 In
rejecting this argument in its May 11, 1989, order denying
OSMRE's motion to vacate, the Board reasoned as follows:
Appellant has operated a deep mine facility together with an
adjoining surface coal preparation plant since the 1930's or
1940's. The record is void of any evidence to support OSMRE's
argument that appellant's stockpiling activity existed on the
date of enactment of SMCRA. This activity was described by
the Administrative Law Judge in his decision as follows:
The unplanned, impromptu stockpiling effort in 1974 was oc-
casioned by an emergency ... which was not experienced again
until 1980. The informal designation of the offending stockpile
storage area was never documented and the area in question
was not so designated by way of an appropriate amendment
to the then current or subsequently issued mining permits.
(Decision at 7). He concluded that by stockpiling coal Valley
Camp was engaged in surface coal mining activities that sub-
jected it to section 522(e) of SMCRA. If an operator was not
engaged in a particular operation on the date of the enactment
of SMCRA, the "in existence" exception of section 522(e)
would not apply. Unless appellant can demonstrate that it had
"valid existing rights" to engage in this particular activity, it
cannot escape the restriction set forth in section 522(e)(4).10
Both Valley Camp and OSMRE appeared to assume that if
a surface coal mining operation otherwise prohibited by Section
522(e) is "in existence" on August 3, 1977, or if the permittee
has VER to conduct the operation, that operation is exempt
from the requirements of SMCRA and the implementing regu-
lations. The Board rejected this notion:
If the prohibited operation is 'in existence,' or if the permittee
has VER to conduct such operation, section 522(e)(4) merely
exempts the operation from the prohibition. The permittee is
still required to conduct that operation in compliance with
SMCRA and applicable regulations. Regardless of whether
Valley Camp's stockpiling operation was in existence on Au-
gust 3, 1977, that operation, plus any other surface coal mining
" The Board first rejected Valley Camp's argument that its stockpiling activity did
not constitute "surface coal mining operations" within the meaning of Section 701(28)
of SMCRA. 112 IBLA at 28, 96 I.D. at 460-61.
o 112 IBLA at 38, 96 I.D. at 466, quoting Order dated May 11, 1989, at 4-5.
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operations conducted in connection with the underground mine,
are subject to the provisions of SMCRA, including those gov-
erning the issuance of permits. Moreover, even if an operator
has VER to conduct certain surface coal mining operations,
those operations must be conducted in accordance with SMCRA
pursuant to a permit issued by the appropriate regulatory
authority. VER only confers the right to conduct a certain
operation; that operation must be conducted in accordance
with SMCRA.5'
c. Application of the "Good Faith-All Permits" Test
Applying the good faith-all permits test was a simple process
in Valley Camp, since the Board found that the record was
"barren of any evidence of property rights in existence on Au-
gust 3, 1977, that were created by a legally binding conveyance,
lease, deed, contract or other document which authorized [Valley
Camp] to produce coal by a surface coal mining operation under
30 C.F.R. [Section] 761.5(a)(1) (1979). ' ' 52 Moreover, there was
no evidence that Valley Camp had made any attempt to obtain
any permit prior to or after August 3, 1977.
d. Application of the "Needed for and Immediately Adjacent
to" Test
The Board proceeded to address Valley Camp's argument
that the underground mine operation constituted an "ongoing
surface coal mining operation" and that the stockpiled coal is
needed for and immediately adjacent to such operation under
30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(a)(ii). The Board was guided in respond-
ing to this argument by Cogar v. Faerber,53 in which the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia applied the "needed for and
immediately adjacent to" test, as it appears in West Virginia's
permanent regulatory program, in determining whether an op-
erator had VER to create new openings to an underground mine
" 112 IBLA at 37, 96 I.D. at 465.
12 112 IBLA at 41, 96 I.D. at 467.
13 371 S.E.2d 321 (W.Va. 1988). The openings would have violated West Virginia
Code §§ 22A-3-22d(3) and (4) (1985 Replacement Vol.).
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
within 100 feet of a public road and within 300 feet of occupied
dwellings, in violation of the West Virginia Code.
5 4
The Cogar court found that in accordance with OSMRE's
suspension notice dated November 20, 1986 the definition of
VER included in West Virginia's permanent program controlled
the issue. Under that definition, "a person possesses valid exist-
ing rights if he can demonstrate that the coal is immediately
adjacent to an ongoing mining operation which existed on Au-
gust 3, 1977 and is needed to make the operation as a whole
economically viable."" The court first considered whether there
was an "ongoing mining operation," stating that "the term
'surface mining operations' is most often used in connection
with activities occurring within an area currently under permit
or for which a permit application has been filed. ' 5 6 Thus, the
court concluded that "[iJn the context of valid existing rights,
we read the statute to mean that an operation includes only that
area covered by a permit or permit application." ' "1 The operator
in Cogar argued that its entire 1,825 acre tract consisted of a
single mining operation, that it had conducted surface mining
operations on a portion of the tract, and that the proposed
openings would be adjacent to this single mining operation. The
court rejected this argument, finding that the openings would
not be "adjacent" to an area covered by a permit issued prior
to August 3, 1977, or to an area for which the operator had
applied for all necessary permits prior to that date.
The Board applied the Cogar court's analysis in Valley Camp,
rejecting the contention advanced by OSMRE and Valley Camp
that the stockpiling operation was "immediately adjacent to an
ongoing surface coal mining operation:"
Under the Cogar court's reasoning, which we find persuasive,
in order to qualify for VER under the 'needed for, and im-
mediately adjacent to, an ongoing surface coal mining opera-
tion' test, as modified by Judge Flannery, Valley Camp must
The relevant portions of that statute provide that after Aug. 3, 1977, "subject
to valid existing rights, no surface mining operations, except those which existed on that
date, shall be permitted ... [wlithin one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line
on any public road ... ," or "[w]ithin three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling."
In addition W. Va. Code § 22A-3-3(w)(l) (1985 Replacement Vol.) provides that surface
mining operations include the surface impacts incident to an underground mine.
11 W.Va. Code of State Regulations § 38-2-2.119 (1983).




still have made a good faith attempt to secure the requisite
permits for conducting its 'ongoing surface coal mining oper-
ation' prior to August 3, 1977. Again, other than seeking oral
approval from WVDNR [the West Virginia Department of
Natural Resources] for its stockpiling operation, Valley Camp
has made no showing that it made any effort to obtain any
permit with regard to the surface impacts of the underground
mining operation. Under the reasoning of Cogar, we conclude
that Valley Camp's stockpiling activity is not being conducted
'immediately adjacent to an ongoing surface coal mining op-
eration.'
5 8
In arguing that the stockpiling operation was "needed for"
the underground mining operation, OSMRE and Valley Camp
relied upon the following definition of VER contained in the
Department's permanent program regulations promulgated on
September 14, 1983, at 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5(c):
A person possesses valid existing rights if the person proposing
to conduct surface coal mining operations can demonstrate
that the coal is both needed for, and immediately adjacent to,
an ongoing surface coal mining operation which existed on
August 3, 1977. A determination that the coal is 'needed for'
will be based upon a finding that the extension of mining is
essential to make the surface coal mining operation as a whole
economically viable.5 9
OSMRE couched its argument that Valley Camp's stockpil-
ing operation was "needed for" its underground mining opera-
tion in terms of the "economically viable" language of the 1983
VER definition. The Board found such an application "reason-
able," but concluded that Valley Camp failed to meet the stan-
dard. At the hearing, Valley Camp's witness responded negatively
when asked whether there was an actual need to stockpile the
coal in the manner in which they did. The Board concluded:
Even if we were to find that Valley Camp's surface operations
at the No. 3 underground mine qualified as ongoing surface
coal mining operations for VER purposes, we would reject the
argument that stockpiling coal on two occasions, first in 1974
5 112 IBLA at 45-46, 96 I.D. at 470.
, This "needed for" rule was related to the "taking" test which Judge Flannery
remanded to the Department for proper notice and comment. See In re Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litig. 22 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (1985). OSMRE
subsequently suspended paragraph (c) of 30 C.F.R. § 761.5. 51 Fed.Reg. 41,961 (1986).
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and again in 1980, is sufficient to demonstrate that such activ-
ity is needed for an ongoing surface coal mining operation." '
3. VER to Conduct Surface Coal Mining Operations on
Federal Lands
a. The Blackmore Co. Case
Blackmore Co. 61 involved a decision by the Director of
OSMRE that Blackmore Coal Company (Blackmore) and Hagan
Estates, Inc. (Hagan) did not have VER to surface mine coal
on certain lands located in the Jefferson National Forest, Vir-
ginia. Blackmore and Hagan had sought a determination that
they had such rights.
On March 9, 1937, the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service (Service), received by condemnation certain lands
located in Wise and Scott Counties, Virginia, and owned by
Hagan, for inclusion in the Jefferson National Forest. The con-
demnation was subject to a mineral reservation which gave Ha-
gan the right to mine and remove all valuable minerals, including
coal, oil, gas, and petroleum.
It appeared from the record that E.M. Frederick & Associ-
ates, Inc. (Frederick), requested permission from the Service to
prospect and mine for coal on part of the lands condemned
from Hagan. By letter dated July 3, 1962, the Service sent
Frederick a proposed permit for prospecting by earthmoving
equipment. However, the Service noted that under its interpre-
tation of the deed through which the United States acquired the
property, surface mining methods, including strip mining and
auguring, were not allowed. The Board surmised that the Ser-
vice's "concern was apparently based upon its research indicat-
ing that strip mining was not practiced in this part of Virginia
until well into the 1940's .... The [Service] thus believed that
extracting coal by strip mining methods was not contemplated
by the 1937 conveyance and reservation. "62
On July 11, 1980, Hagan leased the reserved mineral rights
in 9,973.89 acres of land in Scott County, Virginia, to the W.P.
6 112 IBLA at 48-49, 96 I.D. at 471.
6. 108 IBLA 1 (1989).
612 Id. at 2.
[VOL. 5:537
DETERMINATION BY ADJUDICATION
Corporation (W.P.), and on November 1, 1980, W.P. assigned
all its interest in the coal lease to Blackmore. Prior to June
1983, Blackmore entered into discussions with the Service con-
cerning the development of Hagan's reserved mineral rights.
Because the Service could not proceed with the discussions with-
out an OSMRE determination that Blackmore had VER to de-
velop the mineral estate, Blackmore requested that OSMRE make
such a determination.
By letter dated December 3, 1986, the OSMRE Director
determined that Blackmore and Hagan did not have VER under
Section 522(e) of SMCRA and the implementing regulations.
The Director adverted to 30 C.F.R. Parts 740-745, which re-
quired Blackmore and Hagan to satisfy the requirements of the
Virginia permanent regulatory program, specifically Section
V761.5 of the Virginia Coal Surface Mining Reclamation regu-
lations. That section mirrors 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5, except
that subsection (2)(i) had been modified in accordance with
Judge Flannery's statement in In re Permanent Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation,63 suggesting that a "good faith effort" on
the part of the VER applicant in obtaining all State and Federal
permits necessary to conduct the operation prior to August 3,
1977, would be sufficient to satisy the "all permits" test. Thus,
Section V761.5(2)(i) of Virginia's regulation provided that the
VER applicant must have "made a good faith effort to obtain
State and Federal permits necessary to conduct [a surface coal
mining] operation on those lands on or before August 3, 1977."
The Director interpreted Section V761.5(2)(i) as requiring that
Blackmore and Hagan have the requisite "property rights" un-
der subsection (1) of the regulation, and that they had made a
good faith effort to obtain all necessary permits. He concluded
that "there is no evidence that as of August 3, 1977, there had
ever been a serious effort to obtain all the permits necessary to
mine the coal."' '
On appeal to the Board, Blackmore and Hagan placed into
focus two major difficulties with the "all permits" test as prom-
ulgated by OSMRE and as adopted by Virginia. First, they state
that "[no question has been raised about our property right or
title; just did we have all permits by an arbitrary date subsequent
to condemnation where the condemnor's express document
63 14 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1083, 1090 (D. D.C. 1980).
, 108 IBLA at 4, quoting Decision at 3.
1989-901
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
granted stripping rights. ' 65 Second, they complain that "[i]t
seems odd that we lack VER because we didn't get permits from
Virginia which couldn't issue them." 66
After setting forth the history of OSMRE's attempts at de-
fining VER, the Board examined the additional question of what
version of the definition applies to federal lands located in
Virginia. The Board noted that Virginia's permanent regulatory
program was conditionally approved in December 1981 .67 Under
the terms of the conditional approval, "the Department of Con-
servation and Economic Development, Division of Mined Land
Reclamation, shall be deemed the regulatory authority in Virgi-
nia for all surface coal mining and reclamation operations and
all exploration operations on non-Federal and non-Indian lands,"
and "[o]nly surface coal mining and reclamation operations on
non-Federal and non-Indian lands shall be subject to the provi-
sions of the Virginia permanent regulatory program. ' 6 On June
6, 1983, the limitation restricting the application of Virginia's
permanent regulatory program to operations on non-Federal and
non-Indian lands was removed.
69
In accordance with Section 523(c) of SMCRA and 30 C.F.R.
Section Part 745, on March 26, 1982, Virginia filed a formal
request with the Secretary for a cooperative agreement giving it
authority to administer its approved permanent regulatory pro-
gram on Federal lands within the Commonwealth. Virginia's
proposed cooperative agreement was published as a proposed
rule in the Federal Register on June 27, 198370 and as a final
rule on April 7, 1987, with an effective date of May 7, 1987. 71
However, pursuant to the reservation of authority set forth in
30 C.F.R. Section 740.4(a)(4) and 745.13(o), the preamble to
the final rule contains the following statement concerning VER
determinations:
[C]ertain responsibilities under SMCRA that are reserved to
the Secretary are not delegated by this agreement, such as ...
[determinations of] valid existing rights [on Federal lands].
65 108 IBLA at 4, quoting Statement of Reasons.
6Id.
67 46 Fed.Reg. 61,088 and 61,114 (1981).
30 C.F.R. § 946.10 (1982); 46 Fed.Reg. 60,108 and 61,114 (1981).
69 30 C.F.R. § 946.10 (1983); 48 Fed.Reg. 15,184 and 15,186 (1983).
70 48 Fed.Reg. 29,545 (1987).
7 30 C.F.R. § 946.30 (1987); 52 Fed.Reg. 11,044 (1987).
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Requests for determinations of valid existing rights will be
processed in accordance with the District Court opinion in In
Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation 11, [22
Env't Rep. Cas. 1557 (D. D.C. 1985)A.72
The Board rejected OSMRE's argument that the Virginia
definition of VER should be applied under the November 20,
1986, Federal Register notice suspending the "taking" test, in
which OSMRE stated:
Suspending the rule has the effect of undoing the improper
promulgation and leaving in place the VER test in use before
the 1983 definition was promulgated. The test was the 1979
test, ... as modified by the August 4, 1980 suspension notice
which implemented the District Court's February 1980 opinion
in In Re: Permanent (I) (the 1980 test) [14 Env't Rep. Cas.
1083 (D. D.C. 1980)]. The suspension notice stated that pend-
ing further rulemaking OSMRE would interpret the regulation
as including the court's suggestion that a good faith effort to
obtain all permits would establish VER.
During the period of the suspension OSMRE has decided,
consistent with 30 C.F.R. § 740.11(a), to make VER determi-
nations on Federal lands . . . using the VER definition con-
tained in the appropriate State or Federal regulatory program.
73
The Board observed that the November 22, 1986, suspension
notice did not become effective until December 22, 1986. Thus,
it concluded that "[t]he suspension notice cannot be applied
because it simply was not in effect at the time of the decision
in this case." '7 4 However, based upon the following rationale,
the Board applied Virginia's permanent program definition of
VER anyway: "Although Virginia lacked authority to administer
its approved program on Federal lands until May 7, 1987, and
still does not have authority to make a determination of VER
on Federal lands, its permanent regulatory program definition
of VER should be applied on Federal lands within the Com-
monwealth. 75 Apparently, this conclusion is based upon the
fact that while VER determinations on Federal lands is a matter
reserved to OSMRE under the cooperative agreement, OSMRE
12 52 Fed.Reg. 11,044 (1987).
51 Fed.Reg. 41,954-55 (1986).
108 IBLA at 7.
Id. at 8.
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is required to apply Virginia's definition in making such deter-
minations.
The Board stated that under Virginia's permanent program
definition of VER, Blackmore and Hagan "bear the burden of
proving their good faith efforts to obtain all necessary State and
Federal permits." 7 6 Noting that Blackmore and Hagan, "or their
predecessors-in-interest or agents, attempted to obtain [the Ser-
vice's] permission to conduct surface mining operations in 1962
and in 1975-77," the Board ruled: "One attempt to obtain
permission to conduct surface coal mining operations which
resulted in permission only to explore for coal, which permission
was never acted upon in any way for 15 years, does not consti-
tute a good faith effort to obtain all necessary State and Federal
permits." 7 The Board suggests what steps, in its view, would
have indicated a good faith effort on the part of Blackmore and
Hagan:
[N]either appellant took any further steps on their own to
challenge the [Service's] alleged statements that it could not
process an application for surface mining, to determine what
agency or agencies were responsible for issuing the necessary
State and Federal permits, or even to determine what permits
were required. Appellants' statement that the Virginia Attorney
General doubted the Commonwealth's authority to issue a
mining permit on Federal lands on August, 3, 1977, does not
show compliance with other State permit requirements. Neither
is there a showing that appellants attempted to obtain any
Federal permits that were necessary in addition to surface
mining permits. 78
The Board ruled that OSMRE properly denied the request
of Blackmore and Hagan for VER.
b. The Stearns Co. Case
In The Stearns Co., 7 9 The Stearns Company (Stearns) ap-
pealed from an OSMRE decision rejecting its application for a
ruling that it holds VER to mine coal under Federal lands within




"1 110 IBLA 345 (1989).
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tucky. Stearns owns the rights to the coal "in, upon and under"
the subject lands pursuant to a reservation in the deed dated
December 18, 1937, by which the United States acquired the
lands. By letter application dated March 24, 1986, Stearns sought
recognition of VER to mine the coal by underground mining
operations (including the creation of surface effects of under-
ground mining).
In his December 3, 1986, decision, the Director of OSMRE,
applied the definition of VER contained in Kentucky's perma-
nent regulatory program. Specifically, he found that under 405
Ky. Admin. Reg. (KAR) 24:040 Section 4, Stearns must establish
that it has property rights pursuant to a legally enforceable
instrument to produce coal by surface mining methods, and
further that the applicant had, prior to August 3, 1977, obtained
or made a good faith effort to obtain the permits necessary to
conduct such operations. Based upon Stearns' indication in a
follow-up letter to its application that it had not applied for
mining permits, the Director concluded that Stearns failed to
satisfy the regulatory requirements for VER.
On appeal to the Board, Stearns argued, inter alia, (1) "that
application of the State regulations to deny VER in the absence
of a pending application for all necessary permits as of August
3, 1977, constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property rights
and is inconsistent with the clear language and intent of section
522(e) of SMCRA recognizing an exception for VER;" (2) "that
reliance upon the State regulation in denying the VER applica-
tion constitutes an improper delegation of the authority to de-
termine VER for surface mining operations on Federal lands in
violation of the terms of 30 CFR 745.13(o);" (3) "that in the
absence of a valid Federal regulation governing the VER ruling,
the Board should apply the 'taking' test to avoid an unconsti-
tutional application of the statute;" and (4) "that application
of disparate state regulatory standards to VER determinations
for Federal lands in different states as opposed to a uniform
Federal standard violates constitutional requirements of equal
protection of the law made applicable to the Federal Government
through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 80
Relying upon the Board's previous decision in Blackmore,
Administrative Judge C. Randall Grant, Jr., in the lead opinion,
o Id. at 346.
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rejected Stearns' argument that it should apply the regulation
containing the "taking" test. Judge Grant observed that even
though OSMRE's suspension of the regulation containing the
"taking" test occurred after the OSMRE decision involved in
Stearns, after Judge Flannery's March 22, 1985, decision inval-
idating that regulation, "the Department was without authority
to apply that standard.""1
Noting that Kentucky's permanent regulatory program was
conditionally approved on May 18, 1982,82 Judge Grant found
that OSMRE properly applied Kentucky's definition of VER
pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Subchapter D regarding the Federal lands
program. He reasoned that "[in view of appellant's concession
that applications were not pending for the necessary permits as
of the enactment of SMCRA on August 3, 1977, we find the
rejection of appellant's VER application must be affirmed." 3
While Administrative Law Judge Burski agreed with Judge
Grant that Stearns had "failed to establish the existence of
VER," he recorded his disagreement with the Board's conclusion
that it "may apply the definition of VER contained in the
various approved state regulatory programs in determining the
existence of VER on those Federal lands for which the Secretary
has retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence of VER. ' '1 4
Judge Burski's view is that in such cases "the Board must apply
the presently existing Federal regulatory definition [30 C.F.R. §
761.51, as amended by the Department on August 4, 1980."5
Judge Burski rejects the rationale propounded by the Board
in Blackmore, and followed in Judge Grant's lead opinion in
Stearns, i.e., "that, under 30 CFR 740.11, upon approval of the
state permanent regulatory program, Federal lands became sub-
ject to the state program and, therefore, the state definition of
VER properly applied to determinations of the existence of VER
on all Federal lands within that state. '8 6 He notes that "in
promulgating the 1983 revisions to the Federal Lands Program,
30 C.F.R. Part 740, the Department expressly noted that [vialid
existing rights determinations of [30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1) and (2)]
I d. at 350.
82 30 C.F.R. § 917.10 (1987)
" 110 IBLA at 350.
I d. at 352.
85 Id.
6 Id. at 354.
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areas are of such paramount national importance that this re-
sponsibility appropriately should not be delegated. ' 8 7 He finds
it "scarcely credible that so critical a matter as defining the
terms 'valid existing rights' would have been delegated to the
states, at the exact same time that the Department was expressly
recognizing the paramount national importance of the ultimate
decision."
8 8
Judge Burski rejected OSMRE's argument that the following
language in the November 20, 1986, suspension notice had the
effect of making the state regulatory definition applicable to
Federal VER determinations: "During the period of the suspen-
sion OSMRE has decided, consistent with 30 CFR 740.11(a), to
make VER determinations . . . using the VER definition con-
tained in the appropriate State or Federal regulatory program." 8 9
Judge Burski noted that under 30 C.F.R. Section 732.15, the
State's regulatory program must be "in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and consistent with the requirement of the
Chapter." He observes that "virtually every state permanent
program was approved prior to the change to the 1983 'taking'
test, so that all programs which had defined VER had necessar-
ily, because of the consistency requirement, embraced the 'all
permits test'." 9 However, he noted a problem in the fact that
during the period 1983 to 1986 a number of states amended their
regulatory programs to adopt the "taking" test, which amend-
ments were approved as "consistent with" the new definition of
VER. Thus, the effect of applying the State's definition of VER
is that in those states which have adopted the "taking" test,
Section 522(e)(1) and (2) areas would be governed by the "tak-
ing" test. He was concerned that in Blackmore and Stearns,
"the Board is setting the stage for the eventual application of
the 'taking' test definition to Federal lands within section
1272(e)(1) and (2) areas in those states which have adopted that
definition." 9'
For reasons set forth in Judge Burksi's opinion, OSMRE
would be without authority to apply the "taking" test in making
a VER determination regarding Federal lands. While he focuses
Id. at 355, quoting 48 Fed.Reg. 6,917 (1983).
" 110 IBLA at 355.
19 51 Fed.Reg. 41,955 (1986).
90 110 IBLA at 357-58. (footnote omitted).
91 Id. at 359.
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primarily upon the VER determination involved in Stearns, his
analysis would be equally applicable should OSMRE eventually
attempt to apply the "taking" test as adopted by a state. The
most persuasive reason that OSMRE would be without authority
to apply the "taking" test, at least as long as the Department's
version remains invalid due to invalid promulgation, is that to
the extent that Judge Flannery remanded the "taking" test def-
inition to the Department because it was improperly promul-
gated, this action necessarily invalidated all state regulations
which had been adopted consistent therewith. To the extent,
therefore, that the Department seeks to utilize a taking test in
such states, it is indirectly applying the same regulation which it
could not directly apply at this time.
92
III. PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING APPEALS OF VER
DETERMINATIONS MADE SEPARATELY FROM PERMIT DECISIONS
30 C.F.R. Section 761.12(h) provides that a determination
by the regulatory authority that a person holds or does not hold
valid existing rights shall be subject to administrative review
under 30 C.F.R. Section 775.11. When a determination on VER
is made by OSMRE in conjunction with a decision on an appli-
cation for a permit, administrative review takes place under the
regulations for review of the decision on the application, e.g.,
43 C.F.R. Section 4.1360 et seq. When a VER determination is
made by OSMRE separately from a decision on an application
to mine the lands involved, then administrative review of the
determination occurs in accordance with 43 C.F.R. Sections
4.1390-94. 93 Procedures for administrative review of state regu-
latory agency determinations on valid existing rights would con-
form to the requirements of 30 C.F.R. Section 775.11(b).
Under 43 C.F.R. Section 4.1390-4.1394, a request for review
of the determination is to be filed in the office of the OSMRE
official who made the decision and a copy sent to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals at the same time. 94 The request is to be
92 Id. at 358. See Harman Mining Corp. v. OSMRE, 569 F.Supp. 806, 810-11
(W.D. Va. 1987).
'3 See 52 Fed.Reg. 39,525 (1987).
43 C.F.R. § 4.1391(a). Direct appeal to the Board is provided for "[b]ecause
these determinations will usually involve legal rather than factual issues." 51 Fed.Reg.
35,251 (1986). "If the Board determines a factfinding hearing is necessary it may order
one under 43 CFR 4.415." Id.
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filed, i.e., mailed, 95 within thirty days after the applicant or
permittee is notified by publication in a local newspaper of notice
of OSMRE's written determination. 96 In March 1989, the Office
of Hearings and Appeals proposed to amend this rule to require
the filing of a request for review within thirty days after an
applicant or permittee is notified of OSMRE's written determi-
nation by certified mail or overnight delivery service. 9 The com-
ment period on this and other amendments proposed in March
was reopened in July, 98 and the amended rules have not yet been
promulgated in final form.
The OSMRE official is to file the complete administrative
record of the decision under review as soon as practicable with
the Board. This provision was included in the rule because the
Board's experience under 43 C.F.R. Section 4.1280 et seq., the
rules authorizing appeals to the Board from decisions of the
Director of OSMRE, indicated the need for a statement that it
was OSMRE's responsibility to prepare a record for its decision
and to deliver it promptly if the decision was appealed. In Save
Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc., 99 we repeated our "require-
ments for records forwarded by agencies whose decisions are
subject to our review:"
The proper assembly of a case record should not be a difficult
matter. However, the agency should not wait to begin this task
until after a notice of appeal has been filed. It should start to
assemble a file at the initiation of any process which might
culminate in a decision subject to this Board's review. The
first document in the record should be the one that initiates
the process. In certain cases, this might be a notice from the
agency, which should be placed in a file with any documents
necessary to establish the basis for issuing the notice. Cases
such as this, however, are initiated by an application by a
member of the public, and a case file should be opened upon
receipt of such a document. Any correspondence should be
dated and included in the case file chronologically as it is
issued or received, along with memoranda of meetings and
telephone conversations. See NLRB v. West Texas Utilities
Co., 214 F. 2d 732, 737 (5th Cir. 1954). It may be necessary
" See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1107(g).
- 43 C.F.R. § 4.1391(b).
54 Fed.Reg. 9,852 and 9,855 (1989).
See 54 Fed.Reg. 30,766 (1989).
108 IBLA 70 (1989).
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to include additional reports, plans, and other documents,
depending on the type of case. The final documents added
should be the decision and proof of service thereof. The record
should be maintained in such a manner that when a notice of
appeal is timely filed, the only task remaining is to add the
notice to the record and transmit it to this Board. 0
If the record is compiled and maintained in accordance with this
guidance, it should be possible for the office of the OSMRE
official whose determination on an application for VER is the
subject of a request for review, to copy the record, if it wishes
to keep one for its reference, and forward the original to the
Board within five days. 10 Additionally, if the record is complete
it should not be necessary for the Board to set the OSMRE
decision aside as unsupported. 1 2
The Interior Board of Land Appeals has often observed that
it is incumbent on the agency whose decision it must review "to
ensure that its decision is supported by a rational basis and that
such basis is stated in the written decision and demonstrated in
the record. Otherwise the Department is left open to the charge
that its actions are arbitrary." 03 In the context of reviewing the
rejection of a competitive bid for an oil and gas lease, we have
said that a person "is entitled to a reasoned and factual expla-
nation for the rejection of its bid. Appellant must be given some
basis for understanding and accepting the rejection or alterna-
tively appealing it and disputing it before this Board." 1 4 The
Board has the "plenary authority to review de novo all official
actions and to decide appeals from such actions on the basis of
a preponderance of the evidence in cases involving substantive
rights."' 0 5 It is therefore advisable for the agency to prepare a
decision that provides the procedural background of the case,
the facts from the record, the texts of the relevant legal docu-
ments, and a thorough discussion, with citations, of the reasons
that support the agency's conclusion of the proper application
of the law to the facts. "[T]he Board will require sufficient facts
,0o Id. at 85.
01 See Harriet B. Ravenscroft, 105 IBLA 324, 330 (1988).
,0 See Fred D. Zerfoss, 81 IBLA 14, 17 (1984).
103 Roger K. Ogden, 77 IBLA 4, 7, 90 I.D. 481, 483 (1983).
1' Southern Union Exploration Co., 51 IBLA 89, 92 (1980).
,01 Alvin R. Platz, 114 IBLA 8, 15 (1990); United States Fish & Wildlife Service,
72 IBLA 218, 220-21 (1983).
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and a sufficiently comprehensible analysis to insure that a ra-
tional basis for the determination is present."1' °
Filing a request for review stays the effectiveness of OSMRE's
decision. Section 4.1393 of 43 C.F.R. provides that 43 C.F.R.
Section 4.21(a) applies to OSMRE's determinations under Sec-
tion 522(e) of the Act. The latter regulation provides that "a
decision will not be effective during the time in which a person
adversely affected may file a notice of appeal, and the timely
filing of a notice of appeal will suspend the effect of the decision
appealed from pending the decision on appeal." The applicabil-
ity of this regulation provides an opportunity for administrative
review before OSMRE's decision becomes final agency action
for purposes of judicial review. It permits the Board to review,
and perhaps supplement, the record and the rationale supporting
a decision. It may also protect private parties from investing
resources on the basis of an initial OSMRE decision that may
be modified or found erroneous. Because a determination on an
application for VER that is separate from a permit decision
precedes a decision on an application for a permit, and because
the issues on review of the decision are more likely to be legal
rather than factual, suspending the effect of the OSMRE deci-
sion should not disadvantage the applicant.1
0 7
If the applicant for VER requests review of the OSMRE
determination, OSMRE bears the burden of presenting a prima
facie case in support of its decision and the applicant bears the
burden of ultimate persuasion by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that OSMRE's decision is erroneous. If any other person
seeks review, that person bears both the burden of going forward
with evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion that the
OSMRE decision is in error. 0
IV. SHOULD VER BE DEFINED BY RULEMAKING OR
DETERMINED BY ADJUDICATION?
In the preamble to the 1979 final permanent program regu-
lations, in the context of discussing whether VER must be de-
termined "on a case-by-case basis," OSMRE stated its belief
that VER "is a site specific concept which can be fairly applied
,06 M. Robert Paglee, 68 IBLA 231, 234 (1982).
,07 See 52 Fed.Reg. 39,525 (1987).
1- 43 C.F.R. § 4.1394.
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only by taking into account the particular circumstances of each
permit applicant." '9
OSMRE said it "considered not defining VER, which would
leave questions concerning VER to be answered by the States,
the Secretary and the courts at later times."" 0 OSM stated that
[w]ithout a definition ... many interpretations of VER would
be made and no doubt challenged by both operators and citizens;
and once valid existing rights determinations are challenged, the
permitting process would be delayed."'
This language originated in the January 1979 Comment Eval-
uation Sheet (CES) prepared by the OSMRE task group desig-
nated to consider the issue of how to define valid existing rights.
The document analysed five alternatives in response to the com-
ments submitted on the proposed definition." 2 In the context of
discussing the legislative history of VER the document states
that "the task group has endeavored to determine that point at
which payment would be required because a taking had occurred,
and then to define valid existing rights in those terms, i.e., those
rights which cannot be affected without paying compensa-
tion,"" 3 and this language, too, was repeated in the preamble
to the regulations." 4 The document makes clear that the group's
concern was "to make the exemption more specific" and to
define VER in a way that "would provide a definite standard
against which to determine VER and would be readily enforce-
able by State and Federal inspectors.""'  The document also
makes clear that the task group thought defining VER simply
as "having a property right for the coal as of August 3, 1977,
would be a very broad construction favorable to most operators.
Because property rights are transferrable and saleable, all coal
for which there existed a valid property right on August 3, 1977,
109 44 Fed.Reg. 14,993 (1979).
110 Id.
11, Id.
", The five alternatives were "1) retain present definition of VER; 2) do not define
VER; 3) define VER has having a property right for the coal as of August 3, 1977; 4)
define VER as having all validly issued permits to mine the coal as August 3, 1977; and
5) define VER as both owning a property right to the coal prior to August 3, 1977, plus
either (i) having all permits or (ii) the coal is both necessary for and contiguous to an
ongoing operation." The task group recommended alternative 5. Comment Evaluation
Sheet (CES) at 1. (Available from the J. MIN. L. & POL'Y.).
11 CES at 3.
11 44 Fed.Reg. 14,992 (1979).
"I CES at 18.
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would be exempt from the prohibition on mining. This construc-
tion would make [Section] 522(e) almost meaningless and would
allow almost all mining to proceed despite Congress' prohibi-
tions."'
6
In the preamble to the final rule OSMRE concluded that
"VER should be defined in order to achieve a measure of
consistency in interpreting this important exemption. "117 OSMRE
concluded this discussion with the comment that "[u]nder the
final definition, VER must be applied on a case-by-case basis,
except that there should be no question about the presence of
VER where an applicant had all permits for the area as of
August 3, 1977.118
We suggest that OSMRE's premise that VER must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis was correct, but that it was
contradicted by OSMRE's wish to "achieve a measure of con-
sistency in interpreting" VER. While we appreciate that having
a "definite standard" would be administratively more convenient
than figuring out in each case whether a denial of VER would
constitute a taking, OSMRE's effort to define VER in the 1979
rulemaking precluded the very analysis of the facts and the law
of each VER situation that case-by-case determinations entail.
If, by definition, one must have obtained all permits needed to
mine in order to demonstrate VER, then the failure to have
done so makes a case-by-case examination of the legal instru-
ments that may serve as a basis for VER under state law unnec-
essary.
The Surface Mining Act does not mandate that VER be
defined by rule, and, in our view, adjudication is a more appro-
priate method of making VER determinations because it allows
an evaluation of the particular facts and the applicable law of
a given situation. Ever since the Chenery decisions'19 it has been
clear that an agency is free to choose, with some limitations,
between establishing prospective policies by rulemaking or by
adjudication. Although the Administrative Conference of the
United States recommends rulemaking as generally preferable, it
suggests two advantages of adjudication that seem applicable in
the VER context: the reduced political vulnerability of policy-
'I Id. at 17-18.
44 Fed. Reg. 14,993 (1979).
its Id.
119 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-3 (1974).
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making by adjudication, and the avoidance of the difficulty of
drafting rules that are neither too broad or too narrow."
OSMRE recognized the difficulty of writing a rule that was
"neither overinclusive nor underinclusive of all potential takings
which might result from Section 522(e) prohibitions,"'' and, as
a result, promulgated its September 1983 rule that defined valid
existing rights as a property interest the application of Section
522(e) prohibitions to which would "effect a taking of the per-
son's property which would entitle the person to just compen-
sation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 2 As the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pointed out in its brief chal-
lenging this rule as so far removed from what was proposed in
1982 as to be in violation of the notice and comment provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, however, this definition
would have put both state agencies and the Department in the
position of ruling on applications for VER in terms of a consti-
tutional issue, something they are neither equipped nor author-
ized to do.
2 3
Some of the advantages of developing policy by rulemaking,
e.g., its openness to comments from different perspectives,'2 4 can
be achieved by giving notice in advance that a particular adju-
dication is the vehicle for the resolution of a certain issue, as
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does in its lead cases,' 2 and
by allowing intervention or encouraging amicus briefs on the
matter. The Office of Hearings and Appeals regularly updates a
summary of appeals under the Surface Mining Act that are
currently pending, and the rule governing intervention in surface
mining proceedings, 43 C.F.R. Section 4.1110, is quite liberal,
although it has not always been generously interpreted.
126
2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL AGENCY RULE-
MAKING (1983) 81-83.
" 48 Fed.Reg. 41,314 (1983).
,z2 48 Fed.Reg. 41,349 (1983).
2I Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. U.S.
Department of the Interior, Civil Action No. 83-3368, U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, In re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. II, Civil Action No.
79-1144, dated July 13, 1984, at 15-16. See Amanda Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 395, 87 I.D.
643 (1980); Ptarmigan Co., Inc., 91 IBLA 113, 116 (1986).
22 See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
212 Philadelphia Electric Co., et al. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2
and 3), et al., ALAB-480, 7 NRC 796, 804-06 (1978).




Before the U.S. District Court remanded the Department's
1979 rulemaking effort to define VER in terms of having all
permits necessary to exercise a property right, that rule contained
the provision that the Interior Board of Surface Mining Appeals
applied in the Ronald Johnson II case discussed above, namely,
that "interpretation of the terms of the document relied upon
to establish valid existing rights shall be based upon the usage
and custom at the time and place where it came into existence
and upon a showing by the applicant that the parties to the
document actually contemplated a right to conduct the same
underground or surface mining activities for which the applicant
claims a valid existing right.' ' 27 Although we have criticized
IBSMA's failure to analyze this provision adequately in its Ron-
ald Johnson H decision, the provision nevertheless represents
our view of the appropriate standard to apply in case-by-case
adjudication of applications for VER.
Similarly, Option 1, as set forth in OSMRE's December 27,
1988, rulemaking proposal provides an appropriate vehicle for
determining VER on a case-by-case basis. Former 30 C.F.R.
Section 761.5(c) and proposed and withdrawn' 28 Option 1 share
an approach which emphasizes the importance of State law in
determining VER. As stated by OSMRE, VER exists under
Option 1 "when an applicant has a legal right to the coal
resource and has authority to mine by the method intended, as
determined by State law.'
'1 29
As OSMRE explained in its preamble to the December 27,
1988, proposed rulemaking, Option 1 "finds extensive support
in the legislative history of the Surface Mining Act," and reflects
Congress intention "that there must be some deference to State
law in determining what constituted VER." 30 Prior to proposing
Option 1, OSMRE "reviewed the law of States where coal
mining is conducted to determine whether adoption of the pro-
posed rule would allow surface mining to occur where such a
method was not contemplated at the time the mineral estate was
M7 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(c) (1980).
,21 On July 21, 1989, OSMRE withdrew the proposed rule for further study. 54
Fed.Reg. 30,557 (1989).
,r' 53 Fed.Reg. 52,374 (1988).
, Id. at 52,377.
1989-901
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
severed from the surface estate."'' OSMRE's conclusion was
that "in most States surface mining where the surface is not
owned by the mineral owner is not authorized absent other
evidence that such a mining method is consistent with the parties'
intentions."' 32 Presumably, under Option 1, OSMRE would look
to State law in determining what "other evidence" is relevant
in determining whether surface mining is consistent with the
parties' intentions. Using Polino as an example, evidence relating
to custom and usage would be relevant in determining the par-
ties' intentions in West Virginia.'33
OSMRE's December 27, 1988, proposed rule contains a "new
introductory statement ... [that] constitutes the basic definition
of VER ... [but] does not constitute a test which must be met
for VER to be found."'13 4 Instead, "it simply defines VER as a
right to conduct surface coal mining operations on lands on
which, without such a right, mining operations would be pro-
hibitited [by section 522(e) of the Act]."' 35 There follow two
standards for establishing VER: (1) subsection (a) of 30 C.F.R.
Section 761.5 provides that "[i]n order to demonstrate VER, a
person must show possession of a conveyance, lease, deed, con-
tract, or other document establishing a right to the coal re-
source;" and (2) subsection (a)(2)(i) (Option 1) requires the
person to "demonstrate the right, as determined by the laws of
the State in which the mining would occur, to extract the coal
by the method that person intends to use.' ' 36 These standards
would serve as a basis for adjudicating whether a person had
valid existing rights in a particular situation.
131 Id.
132 Id.
,13 Congress' intention that VER determinations be made in accordance.with State
law is demonstrated in the discussions concerning the broad form deed question. For
example, Congressman Udall stated that there had been "testimony and controversy
about the problem of the so-called broad form deed, but a decision was made by the
conferees that this is largely a matter of State property law and State constitutions, and
that there is a serious question about the ability of the Federal government to move into
such a situation."' 53 Fed.Reg. 52,377 (1988), quoting 121 CONG. REC. H6679 (1975).
OSMRE concludes that "Congress clearly contemplated the preservation of mineral
rights under State law, even where such rights were created by a broad form deed." 53
Fed.Reg. 52,378 (1988).
134 53 Fed.Reg. 52,376 (1988).
"I Id. at 52,383.
,,6 Id. at 52,376-77.
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